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Abstract
Our societies are heterogeneous in many dimensions such as cen-
sus, education, religion, ethnic and cultural composition. The links
between individuals – e.g. by friendship, marriage or collaboration –
are not evenly distributed, but rather tend to be concentrated within
the same group. This phenomenon, called imbreeding homophily, has
been related to either (social) preference for links with own–type in-
dividuals (choice–based homophily) or to the prevalence of individuals
of her same type in the choice set of an individual (opportunity–based
homophily). Choices determine the network of relations we observe
whereas opportunities pertain to the composition of the (unobserv-
able) social network individuals are embedded in and out of which
their network of relations is drawn. In this view, we propose a method
that, in the presence of multiple data, allows one to distinguish be-
tween opportunity and choice based homophily. The main intuition
is that, with unbiased opportunities, the effect of choice–based ho-
mophily gets weaker and weaker as the size of the minority shrinks,
because individuals of the minority rarely meet and have the chance
to establish links together. The occurrence of homophily in the limit
of very small minorities is therefore an indicator of opportunity bias.
We test this idea across the dimensions of race and education on data
on US marriages, and across race on friendships in US schools.
Keywords: social networks, choice–based homophily, opportunity–based
homophily.
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Integration is a major concern of our societies, whose relevance has in-
creased as an effect of globalization. The prevalence of relations between indi-
viduals of the same type or community over links across types – a well known
phenomenon called (inbreeding) homophily in sociology [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]
– has been related to either opportunity–based or choice–based homophily
[5, 7]: while the former (also called induced homophily) refers to a preva-
lence of same–type neighbors in the underlying social network, the latter
reflects a bias towards same–type links in the collective choice of mutual re-
lations, among those possible in a given neighborhood of the social network.
The relation between choice behavior and the underlying social network is
a complex one. Indeed, the latter is often inferred from choice behavior –
friendship, marriage, co-authorship among scientists [9] – which is relatively
accessible to empirical studies. Second, opportunities constrains choices to
the extent that choice behavior can hardly be related to choices of the indi-
vidual, but rather to the choices of the population as a whole. For example,
Refs. [10, 11] shows that individual choices influence in non–trivial ways the
aggregate outcome and Ref. [12] argues that biased mixing of a minority
may be due to homophily of both majority and minority individuals.
Also, the opportunities which an individual faces when choosing whom to
establish a relation with may well be shaped by past choices of that individual
and others. For example, T.C. Schelling has vividly shown that even very
weak preferences for homophilous relations in residential choice, can lead
to strong spacial segregation [13, 14]. Finally, there are many dimensions
(ethnical, religion, education, age, census etc.) which are likely to influence,
to different degrees, the formation of links between individuals, and these are
correlated in complex ways. Disentangling their effect is a non-trivial task
[15, 16].
On the other hand, providing quantitative indicators to disentangle opportunity-
based homophily from choice-based homophily is an important issue if, fol-
lowing Sen [17], if one regards constraints in the opportunities – or freedom
– of individuals as a limiting factor for development. This is particularly
true in cases where the pattern of interaction is shaped by institutions. For
example, friendships between school students is a matter of individual choice
but their pattern of interaction is largely shaped by institutions (clubs, sport
teams, academic tracking [18], etc). So while it is natural to expect choice–
based homophily, the presence of opportunity–based homophily may be a
matter of concern for policy makers.
Our aim, in the present work, is to show that the density dependence
of standard homophily indicators can be used to disentangle the effects of
opportunity–based homophily (OBH) and of choice–based homophily (CBH)
for a minority group inside a larger population. The idea is that the network
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of relations that we observe in the data is a sub–network of the network of
opportunities that all the individuals face, which is however usually not ob-
servable from the data. In the absence of opportunity biases, this underlying
unobserved network of opportunities is not biased and neutral to any minor-
ity. In such unbiased network, CBH has an effect which is proportional to
the size of the minority and, when the latter is small CBH is also negligible,
simply because individuals of that minority have no opportunities to meet.
Therefore, an excess of inter-type links in very small minorities must be due
to OBH.
To be more precise, let q be the ratio of same–type links for a member of a
minority and let p be the relative size (frequency) of this minority. Following
Coleman [20], Inbreeding Homophily can be measured by the index
H ≡
q − p
1− p
, (1)
which is the excess of minority type links normalized so that baseline ho-
mophily (q = p) [2] corresponds to H = 0 and complete segregation (q = 1)
yields H = 1. [21] The index H can be expected to depend on social and
cultural traits. We assume that in similar cultural and social environments,
with different minority fractions p, H is a well defined function of p that
reflects some of these traits. In particular we associate to OBH the behavior
of H(p) for small p. H(p) depends non–linearly on p [3, 8, ?], but for small
p, we can assume [23]
H(p) ≃ A+Bp . (2)
The above observation on opportunities implies that we should have A = 0
in a population of homophilous individuals, with no OBH. Therefore, A can
be taken as an index of OBH. This general observation can be detailed in
a simple probabilistic model, which explicitly takes into account the two
effects (see Model). OBH is modeled by the frequency pi of the minority in
the typical neighborhood of the social network of a minority individual, for
p → 0. The actual social relations are chosen on the social network thus
defined, with a same–type link of minority individuals being chosen x times
more likely than a different–type link. pi and x, in the model, can be derived
from A and B.
We illustrate this idea on empirical data on marriages [24] and friend-
ships [25], where individuals are identified by race and (in marriages) by the
level of education attained. The datasets pertain to different environments
– single American States for marriages [24] or single schools for friendships
[25] – with different relative share p of minority individuals. We make the
strong assumption that every environment is otherwise identical. For each
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Figure 1: IPUMS data for the Black minority (left) are based on same–race
marriages in American States [24]. Each point represents the Black minority
in one State in one of the three surveys (1980, 1990, 2000). On the x–axis we
have the percentage of the minority (the maximum threshold is 10%). On
the y–axis the Imbreeding Homophily measure defined in (1). Lines represent
linear fits for each survey. Add Health data (right) are based on same–race
friendships in American schools [25]. Each point represents a minority in one
school. Linear fits are made for each minority.
of them, we measure the inbreeding homophily index H and compute A and
B from a linear fit for small p, pi and x are computed from the model (see
Model). Fig. 1 shows a sample of the results which are collected in Table 1.
The left panel shows the fit of H(p) for marriages in the minority of Blacks,
in three subsequent surveys (1980, 1990 and 2000). Points are largely scat-
tered around the linear fit, indicating the presence of many factors in H(p)
which are not explained by density p. Still, there is a clear statistical trend.
First, we observe strong CBH (x), which is also observed for other types (see
Table 1). Also notice that A > 0, indicating OBH (pi > 0), though this effect
has been declining over time. OBH in marriages is observed also for other
minorities, but it is close to negligible for Native Americans, and its time
dependence is much weaker. On the contrary, if we consider the minority
of all those people having spent at least four years at college (the maximum
score in the dataset, that we will call top education), CBH and OBH are
remarkably stable across time with respect to this education–based classifi-
cation, to the point that data appears to lie on the same master line, though
p values have increased on average of 46% from 1980 to 2000.
Two considerations are necessary. First, in all the three decades we con-
sidered all the married couples over the whole population, so our samples
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overlap. In order to test for this effect, we ran all the regression also for
the sample of people under 40, in all the three decades. Some of the tem-
poral shift is thus anticipated, but the qualitative outcome is not affected.
As an example, the result for the Black minority is x = 21.48 ± 17.0 and
pi = 0.060 ± 0.03 in 1980, x = 13.21 ± 10.7 and pi = 0.073 ± 0.04 in 1990,
x = 11.56 ± 5.2 and pi = 0.026 ± 0.01 in 2000. Second, our analysis singles
out a single dimension (race or education), but these may be highly corre-
lated among themselves and with other dimensions we do not observe, as
discussed in Refs. [7]. A projection on one dimension does not necessarily
tell how strong its influence is, as the homophily may be due to a differ-
ent characteristic, which is highly correlated with the one we are observing.
Cross correlations, within our analysis, can be probed by testing the hy-
pothesis of independence in the choices and opportunity biases across two
dimensions. This is done testing a version of our model based on multiple
uncorrelated characteristics (see Model). In the case of the minority of top
educated blacks, we fix the choice bias xeb that would be consistent with
the hypothesis of independence and we estimate, under the same hypothesis,
the parameters pie and pib. This yields values (e.g. pie = 0.483 ± 0.41 and
pib = 0.195 ± 0.180 in 2000) that are much larger than the original ones,
thus rejecting the hypothesis. This finding means, as expected, that the
two dimensions are highly correlated, so that the top educated people in the
matching sample of a top educated black are more likely to be black than if
sampled at random from the population, and the other way round.
In school friendships (Fig. 1, right panel), choice–based homophily is still
high and significative, but much less than for the marriages considered above.
Also here x strongly varies from race to race. It is moreover acceptable, for
all the regressions and all the races, to assume that A, and hence pi is equal
to 0, implying no OBH. This is what we would assume from an environment
like a school, where the class formation should be independent on races [18].
Summarizing, we have proposed a method to disentangle choice–based
from opportunity–based sources of homophily (CBH and OBH respectively).
Our case study on two data sets shows that, for what concerns marriages
alone: (i) OBH is stronger for top educated people than for any racial mi-
nority, but CBH is much weaker. (ii) Looking at different time windows, for
marriages, there is a clear decrease of both measures of homophily for Blacks
between 1980, 1990 and 2000. This time–dependence is not so evident for
the other races and especially not for top educated people. For what concerns
the racial dimension: (iii) School friendships do not exhibit OBH (compared
to the school population), while marriages do. (iv) CBH is much stronger
for marriages than for friendships. (v) The values of both are strictly race–
dependent: Blacks exhibit the strongest CBH and (in marriages, if compared
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to the population of the American States) OBH; Native and Hispanics ex-
hibit the lowest values of both (which could be both accepted as uninfluent
in the school data for Hispanics).
IPUM marriages
no threshold obs. B ±95 % A ±95 % x ±95 % pi0 ±95 %
Top Educ. 1980 51 0,863 0,5 0,214 0,05 1,40 0,8 0,102 0,04
Top Educ. 1990 51 0,778 0,3 0,218 0,04 1,27 0,6 0,109 0,03
Top Educ. 2000 51 1,079 0,3 0,197 0,41 1,67 1,8 0,084 0,15
10 %
Black 1980 31 3,808 2,1 0,644 0,10 30,05 24,3 0,055 0,03
Black 1990 31 4,470 2,1 0,511 0,10 18,69 11,8 0,050 0,02
Black 2000 31 6,762 2,2 0,322 0,10 14,71 6,3 0,029 0,01
Asian 1980 50 7,156 4,6 0,417 0,06 21,05 14,2 0,031 0,02
Asian 1990 50 4,710 3,2 0,440 0,07 15,02 11,0 0,047 0,03
Asian 2000 49 4,812 3,1 0,499 0,07 19,17 13,4 0,047 0,03
Native 1980 50 6,449 1,6 0,169 0,04 9,34 2,6 0,019 0,01
Native 1990 50 4,485 1,6 0,126 0,04 5,87 2,1 0,021 0,01
Native 2000 49 4,450 1,6 0,154 0,04 6,22 2,4 0,025 0,01
Hispanic 1980 45 2,877 1,8 0,355 0,06 6,92 4,5 0,065 0,03
Hispanic 1990 42 3,730 1,8 0,234 0,06 6,36 3,3 0,040 0,02
Hispanic 2000 40 3,802 1,6 0,274 0,08 7,21 3,4 0,044 0,02
Add Health schools
Black 39 5,6385 1,0 0,0084 0,39 5,73 4,7 0,001 0,06
Asian 56 3,3358 1,3 0,0109 0,04 3,41 1,3 0,002 0,01
Hispanic 55 0,8504 0,7 -0,0184 0,04 0,82 0,6 0,000 0,02
Table 1: Every line represents a minority in one survey. For the first three
the minority Top Educ. represents all those people who have spent at least
4 years in college. For the remaining lines the minority is represented by a
race. n is the number of observations. We compute A, B and their 95%
confidence interval, with a linear regression of p versus H . In the cases
concerning education there is no threshold on p (the reason for this is that p
has almost doubled in every State between 1980 and 2000). For the remaining
regressions we take only those p below 10% (results are qualitatively robust
to a change of this threshold). We compute x, pi, and their relative 95%
confidence interval, with the model described in the Appendix.
There are several interesting extensions of our analysis to other dimen-
sions such as religion or census, or to co-authorship networks in scientific
research [9]. We found non-trivial density dependence of homophily also
across other dimensions, such as occupation, in marriage data. These cannot
be easily related to properties of the underlying social network, as the type
of work individuals choose may depend on whom they are married to. The
outcome of our analysis needs to be critically evaluated, as our distinction
between choice and external constraints is theoretical at best. If anything, it
may help in identifying those institutional constraints which hamper fruitful
exchanges between members of our society.
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1 The Model
We imagine a society whose individuals are ex-ante divided in different types,
whose number N is fixed and large. Let p be the fraction of a particular
minority in the population. The local environment of each individual is
defined by an underlying social network, with K links for each individuals.
This network is unobserved in the data. K is supposed to represent the
number of possible links from which the actual relations (marriage, friendship,
etc) of a particular individual are drawn. We assume that K is (much)
larger than the actual number k of relations each individual establishes, but
much smaller than N (for schools, k ∼ 6 whereas K ∼ 30 may be taken
as the typical class size, and N is in the order of hundreds). Individuals
are distributed inhomogeneously on the social network, in such a way that
the average frequency of the minority in the neighborhood of a minority
individual is
p¯(p) = pi + (1− pi)p , (3)
with pi ∈ (0, 1). The relation is taken to be linear for simplicity, with p¯(1) = 1.
We assume each individual of the minority has k links, and we assign them
in the following way: i) choose an individual of the minority at random, ii)
if she still has an unassigned link, choose one of the unassigned links in
her neighborhood with a statistical weight 1 + x times larger for links to
minority individuals than to majority ones; iii) stop when all links of the
minority are assigned. For marriages we consider a bipartite network in
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which all neighbors of an individual are of the opposite sex. x has a na¨ıve
interpretation in term of utility in discrete choice models [26], but it also
reflects more complex aspects of the matching problem (see e.g. [?]).
On average, each individual will have


k
p¯(1+x)
(1+x)p¯+(1−p¯)
same–type links,
k 1−p¯
(1+x)p¯+(1−p¯)
different–type links.
(4)
Therefore the ratio q of same–type links, in the whole population, over all
links is q ≃ p¯(1+x)
1+xp¯
, and this for small p leads to
H(p) = pi
1 + x
1 + pix
+ x
(
1− pi
1 + pix
)2
p+O(p2) (5)
from which we can read the values of A and B in Eq. (2). Likewise, from A
and B we can infer that
x ≃
B
(1−A)2
, pi ≃
A(1− A)
1−A +B
. (6)
As a check, we generated synthetic data sets using the model, with x
and pi given in Table 1, and performed a linear regression of H(p). The
resulting values of A′ and B′ were found to be within the 95% confidence
intervals reported in Table 1 for A and B, in almost all cases. We attribute
the discrepancy to a systematic bias due to non–linear terms in H(p), as
discussed above, which is particularly strong when x is large. These issues
would require a more sophisticated estimation techniques, which goes beyond
the scope of the present paper.
Finally, we considered a version of the model with two dimensions of
classification, a and b, for which we have separately identified pia, pib, xa and
xb from the previous model. Under the hypothesis of no correlation between
the two characteristics, individuals in the social network are either drawn of
type a or/and b, independently with probability pia and pib, or they are drawn
at random from the population. The analog of Eq. (3) then reads
p¯ab = piapib + pia(1− pib)pb|a + (1− pia)pibpa|b + (1− pia)(1− pib)pab
where pab is the fraction of ab individuals and pa|b is the fraction of agents of
type a among those of type b. In the same way we suppose that the choices’
probabilities are uncorrelated, so that xab =
(1+xa)(1+xb)
1+(1+xa)+(1+xb)
−1 = xaxb−2
3+xa+xb
. In
the statistical test, we compute xab from the estimated xˆa xˆb and estimate
pia and pib through a non-linear fit of p¯ab on the data (errors are given by the
robust variance estimation). If the resulting values of pia, pib are outside the
95% confidence interval of the original values, we can discard the hypothesis
of independence, as we did above for the case of top educated blacks.
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